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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW-1957
TAXATION
Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court of Ohio decided an important jurisdictional issue
in Youatgstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers.1 The taxpayer had im-
ported iron ore from five foreign countries, unloaded the ships bringing
the ore in foreign commerce, transported it to storage yards near its mills
in Youngstown and thereafter withdrew the ore from storage as it needed
specific quantities -for manufacturing purposes. It excluded these foreign
ores from its inventories for personal property tax purposes. The Tax
Commissioner included the value of the ores and the taxpayer appealed to
the Board of Tax Appeals which sustained its contention -that the foreign
ores were exempt from state taxation by reason of the prohibition against
taxing imports contained in Article I, Sec. 10, Cl. 2 of the United States
Constitution. Upon appeal -by the Tax Commissioner, the Supreme Court
reversed the Board of Tax Appeals and held the foreign ore subject to
state taxation. The majority of the court took the position that fungible
imported property should have comparable treatment with packaged im-
ported articles which lose their immunity from state -taxation when the
original packages have been broken and the contents so acted upon that
they have become incorporated with the mass of property within the state.
Therefore, iron ore is not immune from Ohio taxation -under the follow-
ing conditions: (1) after it has been commingled with other iron ore
imported at a different time, even though the other iron ore is of the
same grade and imported from the same place, and (2) after portions
of such iron ore have been removed for use in manufacturing.
The other jurisdictional tax case2 grew out of a -prosecution of an em-
ployee of the federal government for failure to file a return for 1955
income taxes as required by the Earned Income Tax Ordinance of the
City of Cincinnati. The defense was, essentially, lack of jurisdiction to
tax because the defendant was a non-resident of Cincinnati, living in sub-
urban Hamilton County, and earning his income as an employee of the
Federal government working in .the Engineering Center in Cincinnati.
Since the jurisdiction of municipalities to enforce an income tax against
a non-resident working and earning within its limits had already been
decided favorably to the municipalities, 3 the only jurisdictional issue raised
and not previously decided in Ohio was whether a non-resident earning
and working in a federal instrumentality within a city can -be subjected
1166 Ohio St. 122, 140 N.E.2d 313 (1957), probable jurisdiction noted by the
Supreme Court of the United States, 355 U.S. 911 (1958).
2City of Cincinnati v. Faig, 145 N.E.2d 563 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1957).
8 AngeU v. City of Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E.2d 250 (1950).
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to the city's income tax ordinance. Assuming without deciding that the
Federal Engineering Center in Cincinnati is territory ceded to the Fed-
eral government, the court relied upon the Buck Act4 in 'holding the Cin-
cinnati ordinance applicable to the accused and finding 'him guilty of
violating the ordinance.5
Specific Taxes; Method of Making Real Estate Assessments
Section 5713.01 of the Ohio Revised Code, imposes a duty upon the
county auditor to 'make a periodic appraisal of each lot or parcel of real
estate. While it requires him to view and appraise each -lot or parcel,
it authorizes him to employ experts, deputies, clerks, and other em-
ployees -to assist in fixing the true value. In a case from Montgomery
County, the trial court decreed that a reappraisement was illegally made
because the county auditor did not personally make the appraisal. The
court of appeals6 declared that this conclusion -was erroneous, but it found
that the determination was not reversible error under the circumstances
because the trial court correctly proceeded to make the determination of
true value. The construction of the code section is important, however, as
a precedent. The court pointed out that it would be unreasonable and
absurd to require the county auditor to actually view each lot and parcel
of land within the county. It found that the statutory requirements were
not so exacting and stated that the requirements of the statute have been
observed when the actual work of assessment has been done by appointees
of the auditor under his direction even though the findings are adopted
by the auditor without 'personal knowledge and view.
Assessment for Personal Property; Taxation of
Merchandise Held For Storage
Two Supreme Court cases7 involved the construction of Section
5701.08, Ohio Revised Code, which excepts merchandise or agricultural
'54 STAT. 1059 (1940), 4 U.S.C. 5 105-110. In substance, this act provides that no
person shall be relieved from income tax as imposed by any taxing authority within
any State by reason of the income having been received from services performed in a
federal area within the taxing authority.
In Howard v. Comm'rs. of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624 (1953), the Supreme Court
sustained as an income tax a Louisville ordinance which purported to tax an em-
ployee of the federal ordnance plant by virtue of the Buck Act. Thus, for income
tax purposes, the tax can be levied and collected within the federal area just as if it
were not a federal area.
r The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sustained a similar ordinance of the City of
Philadelphia as applied to a non-resident federal employee deriving his income from
employment in the Philadelphia Navy Yard, within the city, in Kiker v. Philadelphia,
346 Pa. 624, 31 A.2d 289 (1943).
'Reibold v. Haines, 138 N.E.2d 407 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
'Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 166 Ohio St. 116, 140 N.E.2d 411 (1957),
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products belonging to a non-resident from personal property taxation
when such property is being held in Ohio for storage only. -The tax-
payers, both Ohio corporations, had objected, before the Board of Tax
Appeals, that a final order of the Tax Commissioner assessing merchan-
dise held in a storage warehouse for storage only and owned by a resident
was erroneous because the provision in the statute excepting the mer-
chandise belonging to the nonresident is unconstitutional as a denial of
equal protection of the laws to residents. The Board of Tax Appeals
affirmed the order of the Tax Commissioner on the ground that the only
attack made by the appellants was a charge of unconstitutional discrim-
ination which the Board asserted that it had no jurisdiction to consider.
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the Board, declaring that
the classification set up by the legislative exception was neither an arbi-
trary nor an artificial classification. The Supreme Court took jurisdic-
tion of the appeal on the basis that it involved a debatable constitutional
question. The Supreme Court for the second times refused to pass upon
the constitutionality of the proviso and affirmed the judgment of the
court of appeals. It considered that it was unnecessary to pass upon the'
validity of the proviso because the taxpayer under the rule of statutory
construction9 which it chose to follow would have been in no better posi-
tion with the proviso invalidated than it was at that time.
probable jurisdiction noted by the Supreme Court of the United States, 355 U.S.
911 (1958); The Kroger Co. v. Bowers, 166 Ohio St. 121, 140 N.E.2d 415 (1957),
decided on the authority of the Allied Stores case.
'On the previous occasion, in Goodrich Co. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 202, 118 N.E.2d
525 (1954), the Board of Tax Appeals relieved a foreign corporation from an as-
sessment of merchandise which was held in storige in Ohio. The Tax Commissioner
urged the Supreme Court on appeal from the Board of Tax Appeals to reverse the
Board because its decision would discriminate against Ohio corporations and resi-
dents. The Court, however, found the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals neither
unreasonable nor unlawful and refused to depart from the rule of statutory construc-
tion applied in the case, namely that any ambiguity in a statute defining the subjects
of taxation must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer.
The taxpayer contended that the Court should strike out only that portion of the
proviso which read, "belonging to a non-resident of this state," and with this lan-
guage out of the way, the proviso would prevent taxation of the taxpayer's merchan-
dise held in a storage warehouse for storage only. The Court declared that it had no
power to strike out anything less than the whole proviso which would leave the tax-
payer without anything upon which to base its daim for relief. This result followed
from the application of the following rule of construction: "Although a legislative
enactment may be invalid merely because certain limiting language therein makes it
repugnant to constitutional limitations, a court cannot cure such invalidity merely by
striking such limiting language, if the elimination of such limiting language would
substantially extend the operation of the legislative enactment beyond the scope con-
templated by all the language of such legislative enactment."
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Corporate Franchise Taxes
Fisher Brothers Co. v. Bowers10 determined which statute of limita-
tions was applicable to a determination of the amount of the franchise
tax where the domestic corporation's report contains a complete and hon-
est disclosure of all the corporation's assets as required by law. The Su-
preme Court held that the controlling limitations section of the Ohio
Revised Code is § 5703.05 which limits the time within which the Com-
missioner must make the determination to the period ending with the
first Monday in May following the filing of the report. The five year
statute set out in § 5733.15 applies only where a corporation fails to
make any report to the Tax Commissioner as required by law or fails to
report or reports erroneously any information essential to the commis-
sioner's determination of the amount of the tax.
The annual franchise tax imposed upon a domestic insurance com-
pany under § 5725.18 of the Ohio Revised Code is a tax for the year in
which the report must be filed and the tax collected and not for the
previous year which the report covers.'
Sales and Use Taxation
The leading cases of this period are concerned with the application of
exemptions from the sales tax and the grounds for reviewing determina-
tions of -law and fact of the Board of Tax Appeals.
In Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Bowers,'2 the Supreme Court determined that
the Board of Tax Appeals -had correctly sustained an order of the Tax
Commissioner assessing a sale and use tax on certain property used by
a contractor in constructing a public utility project. Since the materials
were used 'before the property was in substantial operation, it did not
come within the exemption granted for property used or consumed di-
rectly in rendering a public utility service.
But when a determination has been made by the Board of Tax Ap-
peals that certain property is or is not actually used directly in the manu-
facture of tangible -personal property, a majority of the Supreme Court
-has consistently taken the position that the coures function is not to
substitute its judgment for that of the Board of Tax Appeals on factual
' 166 Ohio St. 191, 140 N.E.2d 777 (1957). The Supreme Court took the posi-
tion that § 5733.15 is a special statutory provision which applies to a specific subject
matter and constitutes an exception to the general statutory provision governing the
time in which the assessment could be made, namely § 5703.05.
' Columbia Fire Insurance Co. of Dayton v. Tracey, 139 N.E.2d 482 (Ohio Ct. App.
1954).
"166 Ohio St. 396, 143 N.E.2d 123 (1957).
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issues, -but only to determine from an examination of the entire record
whether the decision reached by the board is unreasonable or unlawful 1 3
On the other hand, if there are judicial precedents indicating that
particular personal property is an integral part of a manufacturing plant,
it is much easier to show that a Board of Tax Appeals decision which
holds that specific personal property is not used directly in manufacturing
of personal property for sale, is unreasonable and unlawful.' 4
Inheritance Taxation
Three important areas within this field received treatment in the
cases to be discussed: transfers to take effect at or after death; the suc-
cession to joint bank accounts; and charitable exemptions.
Section 5731.02 (c) (2) of the Ohio Revised Code, applies to suc-
cessions intended to take effect at or after the death of the donor of the
property.
In In re Garbys Estate,15 the court held that the reservation of a life
estate, while conveying the fee of the lands to her sons, was a transfer in-
tended to take effect as to possession and enjoyment at 'her death. Though
the sons took over complete management and control of the land after
receiving the deed, the court insisted that the decedent had done nothing
inconsistent with her full right of possession and enjoyment of her inter-
est in the land.
In In re Schroeder's Estate,'0 the probate court had the dual task of
deciding the nature of the succession to bank deposits and their inclusion
in the estate as probate assets. Four accounts were involved. In the
first three, certificates were issued to John and Nettie Schroeder, without
any rights of survivorship; .the fourth account was opened under a de-
posit contract contained on the signature card which made the entire
amount payable to Nettie upon the death of John. The court held that
the -first three deposits created tenancies in common to which there was
a succession to one-half the amount upon the death of John, with one-
half going into the estate as probate assets. The fourth account was
considered fully taxable to Nettie, in the absence of a showing of any
'Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bowers, 166 Ohio St 419, 143 NXE.2d 710(1957). The minority opinion expressed the view that the determinations of the
Board were inconsistent in these cases and therefore its decision was unreasonable.
"Boardman Supply Co. v. Bowers, 145 N.E.2d 543 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956). The
guiding principle here is that the exemption applies to all component property when
all of the property has a use in the finished product and without each item there
could be no finished product.
s 138 N.E.2d 321 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
144 N.E.2d 512 (Ohio Prob. 1957).
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contribution, and none of it could be placed in the estate as probate
assets.
Two cases were concerned with the exemption of a succession to a
charitable organization.
In In re estate of Bremer,17 the testator devised a gift to an "institution"
of public charity not in existence at the time of testator's death, without
limiting the use of its benefits in whole or in substantial part to Ohio.
While considering that a bequest to "the corporation to be" was a suc-
cession to an "institution" within the meaning of § 5731.09, Ohio Re-
vised Code, the court held the succession taxable for lack of any require-
ment that substantial 'benefits be made available in Ohio. When the
institution is not in existence at testator's death, the issue of exemption
is to be determined solely by the terms of the will creating the succession.
In In re Seamar/s Estate,'8 a majority of the Supreme Court held that
the Salvation Army is an "institution for purposes only of -public charity"
within the meaning of § 5731.09, Ohio Revised Code. The Court ap-
proved prior holdings that charitable purposes include religious purposes
and determined that an institution organized for religious and charitable
purposes, whose 'benefits are open and available to the public generally,
is exempt.
Highway Use Taxation - The Axle-mile Tax
The Supreme Court of Ohio in George F. Alger Co. v. Bowers'9 de-
cided some very fundamental questions concerning the administration
and the basic validity of the axle-mile tax." A Michigan trucker, en-
gaged in interstate commerce, attacked an assessment of this tax before
the Board of Tax Appeals which found the assessments reasonable and
lawful. The Alger Company attacked the tax act as discriminatory, con-
tending that it bore no reasonable relationship to its purpose. The peti-
tioner also attacked the authority of the Ohio Reciprocity Board to cancel
a reciprocal agreement for tax exemption 'between Ohio and Michigan,
17166 Ohio St. 233, 141 N.E.2d 166 (1957).
' 166 Ohio St. 51, 139 N.E.2d 17 (1956). A strong dissenting opinion contended
that applying the rule of strict construction against exemptions, the Salvation Army
with emphasis on religious purposes could not qualify as an "institution for purposes
only of public charity."
In In re Augustein's Estate, 140 N.E.2d 569 (Ohio Prob. 1956) in the court con-
sidered the date at which a tax became effective for determining the running of in.
terest. Deceased was entitled to an interest in her husband's father's estate, through
her husband's estate, but the interest had not been determined at her death (deter-
mined in presumptive death proceedings). The accrual date of the succession was
determined to be the date on which her husband's interest was finally determined.
19166 Ohio St. 427, 143 N.E.2d 835 (1957).
'This tax is imposed by OsIo REV. CODE § 5728.01 ff.
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and finally asserted that the tax act required the Reciprocity Board to
enter into agreements. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Board. In a per curiam opinion, the court asserted it was discretionary
with the legislature to determine that trucks with more than two axles
should pay the tax. There was no unreasonableness here nor any dis-
crimination between interstate and intrastate commerce since the same
formula applied to each.21 Furthermore, the court determined that the
statute was adequate if it bore a reasonable relationship to the purpose
for which created. The Reciprocity Board was held to have statutory
authority to cancel the agreement between Ohio and Michigan. Finally,
the opinion asserted that the General Assembly did not provide for auto-
matic reciprocity.22
Taxpayers' Remedies
In Riebold v. Haines2 3 the court decided that a trial court could prop-
erly order a refund of overpaid real estate taxes voluntarily paid pur-
suant to the valuation fixed by the County Auditor and the Board of
Revision during the pendency of the appeal from that very valuation.
In State v. Carney,24 the Supreme Court determined a question as to
the jurisdiction of the Board of Tax Appeals. The City of Cleveland had
filed application for the exemption and remission of the taxes assessed
against certain lands because they were public property used for a public
purpose. The Board held that it did not have jurisdiction because it
could not, on such an application, pass upon the validity of a tax. The
Supreme Court reversed the Board's denial of the application for remis-
sion, and held that the statute2 5 expressly authorized the Board to deter-
mine the legality of a tax whenever considering an application for a
refund.
In Carney v. City of Cleveland,2 6 the Supreme Court reiterated a fre-
quently applied rule, that the Supreme Court cannot substitute its judg-
ment for that of the Board of Tax Appeals on factual issues. Its sole
function is to determine from an examination of the entire record
whether the decision reached by the board was unreasonable or unlawful.
' The power to cancel is based upon Oo REv. CODE § 4503.37.
22OHIo REV. CODE 5 5728.15, is considered to grant permissive authority. The
Court also relies upon a general principle of tax law interpretation: that exemptions
from taxation are strictly construed, to determine that the foregoing statute vests dis-
cretion in the reciprocity board.
' 138 N.E.2d 407 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956). The case is discussed elsewhere, see note
6, supra, relative to the requirement that the county auditor personally view and as-
sess real property.
2'166 Ohio St. 339, 139 N.E.2d 81 (1956).
'This specific jurisdiction is predicated upon OHIO Rav. CODE §§ 5703.02, 5715.39.
' 167 Ohio St. 22, 145 N.E.2d 664 (1957).
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